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CAPITAL STRUCTURE, PROFITABILITY AND FIRM VALUE: PANEL EVIDENCE OF 
LISTED FIRMS IN KENYA 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between leverage and the financial performance of listed firm in 
Kenya. We use annual data for the period 2002 – 2011. Using various panel procedures, our study finds 
reasonably strong evidence that leverage significantly, and negatively, affects the profitability of listed 
firms in Kenya. However, leverage has no effect on Tobin’s Q, our proxy for firm value. Our results are 
robust to alternative panel specifications and hold for both small-size and large-size firms. Second, 
because the performance of firms depends on other things than just their capital structure, we control for 
the effects of those other variables by including them in our models. In this respect, our findings suggest 
that asset tangibility, sales growth and firm size are important determinants of profitability. Surprisingly, 
asset tangibility consistently has a negative relationship with profitability. For small firms, our results 
indicate that sales growth and firm size are important factors driving firm value (Tobin’s Q). Yet, the 
same variables do not appear to drive the value of large firms. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Finance literature offers two schools of thought that explain firms’ capital structure choices. 
The first school of thought is the trade-off theory, which argues for the existence of an optimal capital 
structure, by incorporating various imperfections to capital markets ignored by the Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) hypotheses, but retaining the assumptions of market efficiency and symmetric information. Thus, 
although increasing leverage might enable a firm to increase its value by profiting from tax shields on 
debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), higher leverage might lead to higher expected direct and indirect 
financial distress costs, which decrease the firm’s value (Ross et al., 2002). According to the trade-off 
theory, therefore, the optimum financing mix coincides with the level of leverage at which the benefits 
and costs of debt financing are exactly balanced. The second school of thought explaining firms’ capital 
structure choice is the pecking order hypothesis. Invoking agency theory, signaling hypothesis and 
information asymmetry, the pecking order hypothesis argues that firms have a preference order for 
different types of finance, reflecting their ease of availability or relative costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
The pecking order hypothesis does not emphasize target leverage; rather, current leverage reflects firms’ 
historical profitability and the need for additional investment funds at some point in time.  
 
At the empirical level, the relationship between capital structure and the financial performance of firms 
has been the subject of several studies since the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, 
the evidence on these relationships has been mixed. Some researchers find a positive relationship between 
debt level and firms’ financial performance (among them, Taub, 1975; Roden and Lewellen, 1999; 
Champion, 1999; Ghosh and Jain, 2000; Hadlock and James, 2002 and Berger and di Patti, 2006). These 
researchers generally argue that financial leverage has a positive effect on a firm’s returns on equity 
provided that the firm’s earnings power exceeds its interest cost of debt (Hutchinson, 1995) and that the 
level of leverage a firm should commit itself to depends on the flexibility with which the firm can adjust 
its debt usage should earnings power fall below its average interest cost (Hadlock and James, 2002). In an 
interesting study of the banking sector, Berger and di Patti (2006) demonstrate that high leverage ratio is 
related to higher profit efficiency. The preponderance of findings, however, is that a negative relationship 
exists between leverage and financial performance (Majumdar and Chhiber, 1999; Gleason et al., 2000; 
and Simerly and Li, 2000; Hammes, 2003; de Mesquita and Lara, 2003; Zeitun and Tian, 2007). 
 
In the debate on the importance of capital structure to financial performance, some researchers also 
emphasize the importance of distinguishing between long- and short-term debt: in a study of the capital 
structure of Ghanaian banks, Amidu (2007) finds that the overall leverage of banks is negatively related 
to operating assets; however, long-term debt is positively and statistically related to operating assets and 
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performance. On the same note, Diamond and Rajan (2000b) argue, from the perspective of bank 
financing, that the possibility of premature liquidation of short-term debt may act as an incentive to 
managers to pursue value maximizing decisions that may enhance firm performance.  
 
Although most of the extant capital structure studies have been carried out in developed financial markets, 
some studies have examined the relationship between capital structure and financial performance of firms 
in developing countries. Hung et al. (2002) find that while high gearing is positively related to assets, it’s 
negatively related to profit margins in Hong Kong’s property markets. Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) finds 
that a high debt level is positively related to performance of micro-finance institutions in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Contrarily, country-specific studies in Africa appear to consistently report a negative relationship 
between capital structure and firm value (Abor (2005) for Ghana, Abor (2007) for South Africa and 
Ghana, Amidu (2007) for Ghana, and Onaolapo and Kajola (2010) for Nigeria). However, Ebaid (2009) 
finds a weak-to-no-effect of capital structure on firm performance for Egypt. 
 
  
Figure 1: Trends in Profitability and Leverage 
 
A study using Kenyan data by Kiogora (2000) also reports a negative relationship between returns of 
firms and their levels of financial leverage. This observation appears to be confirmed by our data, 
gathered after 2000, which shows an apparent negative relationship between key leverage variables and 
profitability measures (see Figure 1). Additionally, available information shows that 68 Treasury bonds 
issued by the Republic of Kenya, 10 corporate bonds issued by seven companies and 60 companies’ 
equities were listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya, as of December 2012. Further, the listed 
companies had floated over 5.1 billion shares valued at approximately KES 868 billion while the listed 
bonds were worth approximately KES 92.48 billion as of end of 2012. Thus, although leverage ratios 
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have generally increased at firm level (Figure 1), debt financing through bonds appears not to be popular 
among listed firms in Kenya. This presents the possibility that businesses rely heavily on bank, and other 
more expensive forms, of debt financing that adversely impact their profitability, causing the visually 
observed negative relationship between debt usage and profitability.
1
 In this respect, the current research 
interest in Kenya stems from the fact that the World Economic Forum (2013) ranks Kenya’s financial 
markets as the second deepest in Africa, after South Africa. If the markets are adequately deep, the cost of 
debt financing should not be so high as to adversely and significantly affect firms’ financial performance. 
 
The foregoing anecdotal evidence raises a fundamental question: is debt financing associated with poor 
firm performance in Kenya? Our research is an attempt to seek answers to this question. We attempt to 
establish if there is a clear linkage between capital structure choice and the performance of firms listed on 
the Nairobi Securities Exchange. We measure performance both in terms of profitability (return on equity 
and return on assets) and firm value (Tobin’s Q) and use a panel empirical strategy. We report results for 
both fixed effects and random effects specifications. Our findings support the view that capital structure 
has a significant (negative) impact on profitability of firms listed in Kenya but not on their value. Our 
results are robust to panels of large-size and small-size firms. The control variables included in the 
analysis also present interesting results. 
 
2.0 METHODOLOGY 
We define the relationship between the performance of a firm ( ) and the factors determining it at time  , 
thus: 
 
              
              (                 )           (1) 
 
where   is a measure of performance (profit or value) – return on equity, return on assets and Tobin’s Q; 
  is the capital structure or leverage metric – debt equity ratio (    ), the total debt to asset ratio (    ), 
and long-term debt to equity (     ) entering the equation alternately;   is a vector of control variables, 
consisting of several factors traditionally believed to determine firm performance – opportunities for 
growth in the economy (    ) proxied by the rate of change in GDP; the asset tangibility ratio (      ); 
the size of the firm (     ), measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; and the rate of growth in 
sales (    ). Because these control variables are expected to be correlated with performance measures 
                                                             
1
 Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014) find that firms run by highly educated managers do not prefer non-bank debts, and 
attribute this finding to the typical forms non-bank debts take in Africa’s capital markets –  trade credits and leases 
– “which are contract types that are not  competitive against bank debts in terms of size and maturity structure.” 
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(dependent variables), their exclusion from the tests may bias estimates.  ,   and   are the coefficients to 
be estimated.  
 
Firm’s size and growth may influence performance since larger firms tend to enjoy economies of scale, 
which may positively influence financial results (Jermias 2008). Therefore, a positive relationship 
between firm’s size and financial performance is expected. Asset tangibility, proxied by the ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets, is also considered as an important determinant of performance. The importance of 
asset tangibility in a firm’s operations is emphasized by Akintoye (2009) who argues that a firm will have 
smaller costs of financial distress if they retain large investments in tangible assets than those that rely on 
intangible assets. All else equal, the more tangible assets a firm has, the greater is a manufacturing firm’s 
ability to produce its product and generate more revenue from sales. Thus, for such firms, a positive 
relationship is expected between asset tangibility and financial performance. However, firms in the 
services sector and retail sectors, which do not engage in actual production, may require more “soft” 
assets such as inventories and accounts receivable in the ordinary course of events. Since such firms may 
perform better with fewer tangible assets, a negative relationship is expected. Clearly, the sign of the asset 
tangibility variable depends on which of the two categories of firms dominates the sample. Finally, a 
positive relationship is expected between growth opportunities (proxied by the rate of GDP growth) and 
financial performance. It is important to note that leverage can affect profitability and firm value through 
taxation. Indeed, several empirical investigations have demonstrated a clear linkage between corporate 
taxation and capital structure (see, e.g., Barclay, et al., 2013; Lee and Kuo, 2014). However, our 
investigation shows that Kenya did not have a substantial change in corporate tax laws and rates during 
the study period. Consequently, the taxation variable is expected to be largely constant over the period 
and so has been excluded from the analysis.  
 
Now, beyond the company-specific factors identified, we expect that individual companies included in 
the sample might have other unobserved idiosyncrasies that set them apart from each other. To take care 
of such unobserved individual-specific effects, we re-write equation (1) as follows: 
 
              
                          (2) 
 
where             such that   , the time-invariant company-specific effects, account for unobserved 
heterogeneity and     is white noise. Equation (2), is first estimated as a fixed effect model (FEM), on the 
assumptions that                ;               ;                     ; and            
 . In 
the alternative specification, equation (2) is estimated as a random effects model (REM) in which case we 
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assume that  
 
 are pure stochastic disturbance terms uncorrelated with each other (            , for 
all    ), uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (             ) as well as with the random error 
term (             ). In this case,         and, as before,           
 . In terms of econometric 
soundness, both the fixed effects and the random effects models have been variously criticized on several 
grounds (see, e.g., Baltagi, et al., 2008).  
 
In response to the criticisms, we perform diagnostic tests to gauge the suitability of both specifications 
using the Restricted F-test for the fixed effects models and the Hausman test for the random effects 
models. If the fixed effects model is the appropriate specification (compared to, say, the restricted pooled 
model specification), the Restricted F-test should fail to reject the hypothesis that fixed effects estimator 
produces consistent coefficients. In that case, and in absence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in 
the error term (or if they have been adjusted for in the standard errors), we can conclude that fixed effects 
estimates are efficient. Similarly, the null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the coefficient estimates 
from the random effects specification are consistent. Failure to reject this hypothesis vindicates the 
appropriateness of the random effects specification for the data. 
 
3.0 DATA 
This study examines the relationship between capital structure and firm performance of publicly quoted 
companies at the Nairobi Securities Exchange using data for the period 2002 through 2011. Observations 
are sampled at annual intervals because capital structure revisions often require the ratification of 
company shareholders, who typically meet on an annual basis in Kenya. Year 2002 is important in several 
respects. First, it coincided with the end of the 2000/2001 global recession. Second, the year also 
coincided with an important event in Kenya’s history: the change of political leadership from the 
independence party, KANU, to a different political party for the first time since the country’s political 
independence. The incoming political regime was widely viewed as more business friendly than the 
outgoing one. Third, 2002 also marked the end of the first decade of Kenya’s economic reforms. Thus, 
the performance of firms was expected to reflect the better economic risk and sovereign risk 
environments as well as improved access to funding because economic reforms would make a wider 
range of financing instruments available to businesses. The listed companies are analyzed first as a panel 
of the entire stock market and then by firm size. The performance and capital structure data are collected 
from firms’ audited financial statements contained in NSE handbooks. 
 
The Nairobi Securities Exchange had sixty listed firms at the end of 2011. However, several of the firms 
were listed after 2002 and hence did not have a time series long enough to enable us include them in the 
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analysis. For some firms, we were unable to get some of the required data, especially on asset tangibility 
and on debt financing. Such firms were left out of the analysis. The sample also excluded firms in the 
financial sector, including banks and insurance companies, because, as Diamond and Rajan (2000a) point 
out, “bank assets and functions are not the same as those of industrial firms”. Indeed, the capital structure 
of deposit-taking financial firms is often dictated by regulatory rules such as minimum capital 
requirements. Similarly, our analysis excluded firms that had been suspended from trading, and therefore 
had missing data, at some point, during the period. The final sample consisted of 29 listed firms. 
  
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
  
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev Skewness 
Return on equity (ROE) 0.0913 0.0923 -0.6381 0.5348 0.1418 -1.8388 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.0959 0.0928 -0.1657 0.5411 0.1835 -1.5276 
Tobin’s Q 1.8460 0.9342 0.0213 90.122 5.4444 14.806 
Total debt to total assets (DA) 0.5702 0.5422 0.1032 0.6886 0.2330 0.1441 
Total debt to equity (DE) 0.8470 0.5665 0.1750 7.8937 0.9709 4.6402 
Long-term debt to equity (LTD) 0.5147 0.2782 0.0000 8.3751 1.3416 10.116 
Asset tangibility (AT) 0.7961 0.8031 0.0924 0.9062 0.2926 -1.3490 
Firm size 10.134 12.242 0.4453 23.545 8.6256 0.1294 
Sales growth (SG) 1.1300 1.1092 -0.0804 2.7264 0.2801 1.9369 
Growth opportunities (Grow) 0.0805 0.1025 -0.0916 0.1699 0.0757 -1.0752 
 
The table shows the descriptive statistics for variables used in the study. The variables are defined thus: Tobin’s Q = 
(Market value of equity + Book value of debt) ÷ Book value of assets; SG is the annual rate of growth in sales; Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets; Asset Tangibility is defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets;. “Grow” 
is the annual growth in GDP, believed to represent opportunities for firm expansion in the economy.  
 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. The statistics show that the 
mean value for return on equity (ROE) is 9.13% with a negative skewness, indicating that most of the 
firms are “clustered” on the left side of the distribution. The mean return on assets invested (ROA) is 
9.59%, also with negative skewness. Curiously, the average firm in the market appears to have a higher 
return on assets than return on equity! However, a closer look reveals that the variability in returns on 
assets is substantially higher than that of the return on equity suggesting that the mean ROA must have 
been pulled upwards by extreme values. This becomes more or less obvious when one considers the 
medians, which are almost similar for the two return metrics. Tobin’s Q, a measure that combines market 
performance with book values, shows a high mean value of 1.846. This may indicate that most of the 
firms are overvalued relative to their book values.
2
  
 
                                                             
2 We were unable to secure the market values of debt and hence surrogated the same with book values.  
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The capital structure ratios show that the average firm listed on the NSE employs only 0.5147 Kenyan 
Shilling of long-term debt for every Shilling of equity employed. Clearly, Kenyan firms either prefer to 
finance their long-term activities through equity or find themselves in that situation courtesy of 
uncontrollable reasons such as unavailability of diversified long-term financing sources in the capital 
market (see Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014). However, when short-term debt is considered, every Shilling of 
equity employed is matched by about 0.847 Shillings of debt. Thus, even with the short-term debt, firms 
appear to use less debt in general than they use equity to finance their activities, perhaps due to the high 
cost of long-term debt, or difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Total debt to 
asset ratio shows that only about 57% of firms’ total assets are financed by debt capital, further 
confirming Kenyan firms’ lack of enthusiasm for debt financing. About 79.6% of all assets are tangible. 
 
Table 2  
Correlations and unit root tests 
 
Panel A: Correlation matrix of variables 
ROE ROA TQ DA DE LDE AT Size SG Grow  
1.0000 0.8632 0.1059 0.0624 -0.1654 -0.3421 -0.4401 -0.1851* 0.2257 -0.0238 ROE 
 1.0000 0.1063 0.0318 -0.1753 -0.3427 -0.4610 -0.1820* 0.2256 0.0103 ROA 
  1.0000 0.0660 0.0201 -0.0515 -0.0210 0.0340 -0.0075 -0.0451 TQ 
   1.0000 0.2470* 0.0976 0.0535 -0.0171 0.1053 0.0312 DA 
    1.0000 0.2425* 0.3027 0.1197 0.0245 0.0215 DE 
     1.0000 0.2913* -0.0353 -0.0551 0.0703 LDE 
      1.0000 0.1923* -0.1595* -0.0269 AT 
       1.0000 -0.0930 0.0047 Size 
        1.0000 -0.0249 SG 
         1.0000 Grow 
Panel B: Unit root tests results 
ROE ROA TQ DA DE LDE AT Size SG Grow  
-11.84 
[0.0000] 
-12.12 
[0.0000] 
-353.56 
[0.0000] 
-9.48 
[0.0000] 
-9.62 
[0.0000] 
-15.46 
[0.0000] 
-15.21 
[0.0000] 
-8.02 
[0.0000] 
-18.58 
[0.0000] 
-5.82 
[0.0018]  
 
ROE is return on equity, ROA is return on assets, TQ is Tobin’s Q, DA is total debt to total asset ratio, DE is total 
debt to equity ratio, LDE is long-term debt to equity ratio, AT is asset tangibility, “Size” is log of total assets, SG is 
the percentage change in sales, “Grow” is the annual percentage change in GDP.  
Panel A: * implies that the correlation coefficient is significant at 5%.  
Panel B: Figures in square brackets are the p-values of the Levin-Lin-Chu panel unit root test statistics. Unit root 
tests for the “Grow” are run using the ADF individual unit root test.  
 
Table 2 presents an analysis of the “relations” between the variables in the analysis. Panel A displays the 
correlation matrix for the variables. The correlation coefficients between explanatory variables are 
generally low, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious concern in the estimations. To avoid 
8 
 
spurious regression estimates in our empirical analysis, it is necessary that variables be stationary. We run 
panel unit root tests using the method proposed by Levin et al. (2002) and individual unit root test for the 
variable “Grow” using the augmented Dickey-Fuller method. Results, presented in Panel B of Table 2, 
shows that the unit roots hypothesis is rejected by all variables at the 1% level of significance. 
 
4.0 EMPIRICAL TESTS RESULTS 
4.1 Results of baseline tests 
The results of the estimation of the panel data models with each of the performance measures and for the 
full sample of observations are discussed in this section. Time dummies are included in both the fixed 
effects model (FEM) and random effects model (REM) to take care of unobserved time-specific effects 
that may influence firm performance. We report results for profitability and value separately. 
 
4.1.1 Capital structure and profitability 
Table 3 presents the results with return on equity (ROE) as the measure of firm profitability. As shown in 
the table, there is a negative relationship between each of the three capital structure metrics and the return 
on equity. Capital structure is a significant variable informing the return on equity under the random 
effects specification when leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to equity (DE) and as a ratio of 
long-term debt to equity (LDE). When leverage is measured as total debt to assets, capital structure is not 
significant under both fixed effects and random effects specifications.  
 
The single most important variable affecting the return on equity of firms listed in Kenya, under both 
specifications, is asset tangibility. We interpret this variable to represent firms’ “earning power/potential”.  
Thus, for manufacturing firms, a higher level of tangible assets will enhance earnings through its positive 
impact on the ability to produce. For firms in the services and retail sectors, a high level of tangible assets 
may compromise the ability to provide service or sell merchandise as it ties down money on (fixed) 
assets, which do not generate income. Coefficient estimates show that an increment in tangible assets by 
100% would elicit a drop in returns on equity of the average firm listed on Kenya’s Nairobi Securities 
Exchange by between 11% and 17%. The negative coefficient finding is consistent with the findings of 
Muritula (2012); it may be explained by the fact the average firm listed at the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange (as in most parts of the frontier markets) does not engage in manufacturing activities and hence 
find current assets more useful in the ordinary course of their business. In fact, only about 28% of the 
sampled firms engaged in manufacturing activities. 
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Table 3 
Regression outputs for return on equity (dependent variable) as performance measure 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
  FEM REM  FEM REM  FEM REM 
Constant  -0.30* 
(-1.86) 
0.12** 
(2.44) 
 -0.35** 
(-2.54) 
0.12*** 
(2.65) 
 -0.34** 
(-2.10) 
0.12*** 
(2.61) 
Total debt to assets  -0.01 
(-0.14) 
-0.01 
(-0.18) 
      
Total debt to equity     -0.02 
(-1.52) 
-0.01* 
(-1.78) 
   
Long-term debt to equity        -0.02* 
(-1.75) 
-0.21*** 
(-4.01) 
Asset tangibility  -0.13* 
(-1.96) 
-0.17*** 
(-5.28) 
 -0.11** 
(-2.02) 
-0.15*** 
(-4.80) 
 -0.11** 
(-2.05) 
-0.14*** 
(-4.59) 
Firm size  0.04*** 
(2.91) 
-0.001 
(-0.91) 
 0.05*** 
(4.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.82) 
 0.05*** 
(3.03) 
-0.002 
(-1.14) 
Sales growth   0.03 
(1.48) 
0.07*** 
(2.79) 
 0.03 
(1.13) 
0.07*** 
(2.84) 
 0.03 
(1.20) 
0.07*** 
(2.85) 
Growth opportunities   -0.25 
(-0.79) 
-0.13 
(-0.64) 
 -0.23 
(-0.75) 
-0.11 
(-0.53) 
 -0.25 
(-0.86) 
-0.12 
(-0.59) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.42   0.43   0.45  
Durbin-Watson statistic   1.084   1.072   1.131  
F-statistic  6.11 
[0.00] 
  6.31 
[0.00] 
  6.86 
[0.00] 
 
Restricted F-test  4.08 
[0.00] 
  4.31 
[0.00] 
  4.04 
[0.00] 
 
Breusch-Pagan test   54.85 
[0.00] 
  58.35 
[0.00] 
  50.88 
[0.00] 
Hausman test   11.46 
[0.57] 
  13.93 
[0.38] 
  13.75 
[0.39] 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates (with their t-values in braces). Standard errors for the fixed effects model 
estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson statistic is evaluated against 
critical values tabulated in Bhargava et al. (1982); the relevant critical values at 5% are:            and    = 
1.8769. In square brackets are p-values of the reported test statistics.  
 
Opportunities for growth presented by the economy appear not to contemporaneously influence firms’ 
return on equity. The growth in sales is positively related to, and significantly affects, return on equity 
under the random effects model. Similarly, firm size is positively related to and significantly affects 
returns on equity under the fixed effects model (the variable has a negative sign under the random effects 
model; however, in each of the equations, the coefficient is not only insignificant but also very small in 
magnitude suggesting that it has no relationship at all with the return on equity).  
 
Diagnostic statistics show that our model is robust. First, the Durbin-Watson statistic, which tests for first 
order serial correlation in the errors of a regression output, shows that the hypothesis of positive auto-
correlation is not rejected, at the 5% level, under the fixed effects specification. However, because the 
10 
 
standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, this does not present any threats 
to the consistency of our estimates. Second, the Adj-R
2
 shows that the variables jointly explain between 
42% and 45% of the variation in the return on equity of firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. 
 
Table 4 
Regression outputs for return on assets (dependent variable) as performance measure 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
  FEM REM  FEM REM  FEM REM 
Constant  -0.23 
(1.30) 
0.14*** 
(3.06) 
 -0.28* 
(-1.87) 
0.14*** 
(3.32) 
 -0.26 
(-1.54) 
0.14*** 
(3.30) 
Total debt to assets  -0.0002 
(-0.00) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
      
Total debt to equity     -0.02* 
(-1.86) 
-0.01* 
(-1.68) 
   
Long-term debt to equity        -0.02** 
(2.12) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.96) 
Asset tangibility  -0.15*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.18*** 
(-5.92) 
 -0.13*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.16*** 
(-5.37) 
 0.13*** 
(3.32) 
-0.16*** 
(5.28) 
Firm size  0.04** 
(2.25) 
-0.001 
(-0.70) 
 0.04*** 
(2.90) 
-0.001 
(-0.60) 
 0.04** 
(2.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.91) 
Sales growth   0.02 
(1.17) 
0.06** 
(2.57) 
 0.02 
(0.81) 
0.06*** 
(2.62) 
 0.02 
(0.95) 
0.06*** 
(2.63) 
Growth opportunities   0.12 
(0.41) 
0.24 
(1.26) 
 0.14 
(0.52) 
0.26 
(1.41) 
 0.12 
(0.43) 
0.25 
(1.36) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.44   0.46   0.48  
Durbin-Watson statistic   1.262   1.262   1.302  
F-statistic   6.65 
[0.00] 
  6.96 
[0.00] 
  7.43 
[0.00] 
 
Restricted F-test  4.80 
[0.00] 
  5.11 
[0.00] 
  4.74 
[0.00] 
 
Breusch-Pagan test   82.73 
[0.00] 
  85.82 
[0.00] 
  76.33 
[0.00] 
Hausman test   9.81 
[0.71] 
  13.65 
[0.40] 
  12.89 
[0.46] 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates (with their t-values in braces).Standard errors for the fixed effects model 
estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson statistic is evaluated against 
critical values tabulated in Bhargava et al. (1982); the relevant critical values at 5% are:            and    = 
1.8769. In square brackets are p-values of the reported test statistics.  
 
Consistent with the assumptions underlying the fixed effects model specification (see e.g., Gujarati, 
2004), the test for the hypothesis of a common intercept for all firms in the sample (restricted F-test) is 
rejected at 1%; this supports the argument that individual firms in the sample have unique attributes that 
drive their profitability. Thus, a fixed effects model is more appropriate for this analysis than would a 
model, such as pooled regression, that restricts the intercept of individual units to be homogeneous. The 
fixed effects specification is also “validated” by the F-test for goodness of fit, which rejects the 
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hypothesis that the regressors are not jointly significant. Finally, we evaluate the “validity” of the random 
effects model using the Hausman test; in each case, the test fails to reject the hypothesis that our estimates 
are consistent. Similarly, the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the hypothesis of zero-covariance of unit-specific 
error terms, upholding a key assumption of the REM specification.  
 
Next, we analyze the findings obtained with the return on assets (ROA) as the measure of firm 
profitability. Results are presented in Table 4. As before, there is a dominant negative relationship 
between leverage and profitability. Two, out of three, leverage variables (DE and LDE) are statistically 
significant under both specifications, allowing us to conclude that leverage adversely affects firm 
profitability. These findings, and those obtained using the return on equity as the measure of profitability, 
can explain why firms listed in Kenya prefer to finance their activities through equity – the use of debt 
impacts negatively on reported profits. Asset tangibility still plays a prominent role in influencing firm 
profitability – with a predominantly negative coefficient. As before, Hausman tests results show that the 
random effects specification appears to yield consistent estimates just like the fixed effects specifications 
seem not to violate the heterogeneity assumption underlying the individual unit intercepts estimates (see 
the restricted-F tests results). Under the random effects specification, we observe that growth in sales by 
1% elicits an increment in profitability of between 6% (return on assets) and 7% (return on equity). The 
opportunities presented by the economy (GDP growth) and firm size appear to have no impact on the 
reported profits of Kenyan firms. And from the fixed effects results, we observe that an increment in firm 
size by 1% may cause a firm to report 4% higher profitability. A relationship of this nature may provide 
managers with the incentive to engage in excessive diversification and expansion. 
 
4.1.2 Capital structure and firm value 
Finally, we analyze the relationship between capital structure and firm value. Firm value is proxied by 
Tobin’s Q in our empirical tests. Results are presented in Table 5. Consistent with our findings on firm 
profitability, our results show a (predominantly) negative relationship between firm value and leverage. 
However, in contrast to profitability findings, we find that leverage has no statistically significant impact 
on firm value under both the fixed effects and random effects specifications. The fixed effects model, 
however, performs rather dismally for the Tobin’s Q metric: the F-test for goodness of fit fails to reject 
the hypothesis that the regressors are “inappropriate” as predictors of value under this specification. And 
the coefficients of determination show that all the variables explain just about 3% of the variations in 
Tobin’s Q. Nonetheless, the restricted F-test indicates that this specification would still be better than one 
in which cross-sectional units are restricted to be homogeneous in intercept.  
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Table 5 
Regression outputs for Tobin’s Q (dependent variable) as performance measure 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
  FEM REM  FEM REM  FEM REM 
Constant  10.68 
(1.23) 
3.04 
(1.48) 
 10.91 
(1.23) 
3.86 
(1.95) 
 11.35 
(1.23) 
3.74* 
(1.89) 
Total debt to assets  2.11 
(1.09) 
2.03 
(1.34) 
      
Total debt to equity     -0.27 
(-0.97) 
-0.13 
(-0.35) 
   
Long-term debt to equity        -0.07 
(-1.05) 
-0.17 
(-0.64) 
Asset tangibility  1.85 
(0.92) 
-0.43 
(-0.35) 
 2.05 
(0.95) 
-0.43 
(0.33) 
 1.89 
(0.92) 
-0.08** 
(-2.06) 
Firm size  -0.95 
(-1.08) 
0.02 
(0.56) 
 -0.86 
(-1.06) 
0.02 
(0.50) 
 -0.92 
(-1.07) 
0.02 
(0.47) 
Sales growth   -0.24 
(-0.35) 
-0.30 
(-0.25) 
 -0.26 
(-0.36) 
-0.19 
(-0.16) 
 -0.21 
(-0.31) 
-0.17 
(-0.14) 
Growth opportunities   -16.69 
(-0.90) 
-20.92** 
(-2.09) 
 -15.38 
(-0.87) 
-20.01** 
(-2.00) 
 -15.64 
(-0.88) 
-19.73** 
(-1.97) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.04   0.03   0.03  
Durbin-Watson statistic   1.064   1.073   1.071  
F-statistic   1.27 
[0.14] 
  1.25 
[0.15] 
  1.25 
[0.16] 
 
Restricted F-test  1.54 
[0.04] 
  1.58 
[0.04] 
  1.57 
[0.04] 
 
Breusch-Pagan test   1.48 
[0.22] 
  1.56 
[0.21] 
  1.83 
[0.18] 
Hausman test   10.00 
[0.69] 
  10.99 
[0.61] 
  10.17 
[0.68] 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates, with their t-values in braces. Standard errors for the fixed effects model 
estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson statistic is evaluated against 
critical values tabulated in Bhargava et al. (1982); the relevant critical values are:            and    = 1.8769. 
In square brackets are p-values of the reported diagnostic test statistics. 
 
Now, since the Hausman test appears to give a “clean bill of health” to the random effects specification, 
we concentrate the rest of our analysis on the outcome of the random effects estimation. Of the control 
variables, asset tangibility is consistently negative but significant in only one of the equations. The 
negative relationship can again be explained by the tilt in favor of non-manufacturing firms in our sample. 
Interestingly, we find that, there is a positive, although insignificant, relationship between firm size and 
firm value. The finding of an insignificant relationship is remarkable because many studies (see, e.g., 
Berger and Ofek, 1995) have demonstrated that, overinvestment (and hence firm size) is associated with 
lower firm value. Indeed, the argument in agency theory is that overinvestment, which may amount to 
managerial empire building, is not desirable from shareholders’ point of view, because diversification, 
which is it’s stated intention, can be achieved by shareholders on their own. Growth opportunities 
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presented by the economy appear to have a negative and significant contemporaneous effect on the values 
of firms listed in Kenya. The negative relationship is puzzling. To comprehend it, we conjencture that 
investors believe that economic growth might present opportunities for new entrants to, and intensify 
competition in, various industries and hence may adversely affect firms’ future cash flows.  The Breush-
Pagan tests fail to reject the hypothesis that the variances of unit-specific errors were zero. 
 
4.2 Firm size and the effect of leverage on financial performance 
Overall, our baseline results indicate that capital structure choices have a statistically significant effect on 
the profitability, but have no effect on the value, of firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange in 
Kenya. In this section, we attempt to provide some robustness checks to these results. We do this by 
running similar but separate regressions for small-size firms and large-size firms. Size of the firm is 
measured, as before, by the logarithm of total assets. We define small-size firms as those with single digit 
logs of total assets (values expressed in millions before logs are taken) and large-size firms as those with 
double digit logs of total assets. This gives us thirteen small-size firms and sixteen large-size firms.  
 
Results for random effects and fixed effects regressions are qualitatively similar. Thus, for the three 
financial performance metrics, and for both small- and large-size firms, we only report, and discuss, 
results of the fixed effects specifications. Results for small-size firms are displayed in Table 6. Consistent 
with our baseline findings, the results indicate that a negative and significant relationship exists between 
leverage and the profitability of small firms in Kenya.
3
 Our baseline results are therefore robust to small-
size firms. All the control variables also appear to have a significant influence on small-firm profitability. 
In particular, it is important to emphasize the seemingly important role played by growth opportunities 
presented by the economy on the performance of small firms. One could conjecture that, in a competitive 
environment, small firms rely heavily on the expansion in demand for products and services created by 
greater economic activity to improve their revenue stream, through more aggressive product promotion. 
That is, smaller firms strive to take advantage of economic changes as they unfold.  
 
This can be contrasted with larger firms, for which an expansion in economic activity is associated with a 
statistically significant (at 10%) decline in return on equity and no significant (again negative) influence 
on the return on assets (Table 7). What explains these surprise negative contemporaneous relationships? 
Perhaps, because of the size, and presumption of superior market power, larger firms are more 
                                                             
3
 As before, these results are true when leverage is measured as the ratios of long-term debt to equity and total 
debt to equity. When leverage is measured as total debt to total assets, we obtain a positive but insignificant 
relationship, both for return on equity and return on assets. 
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complacent and do not engage in aggressive promotion of their products to take advantage of changes in 
the economic environment as they unfold. This relationship was also observed for the whole sample in the 
case of return on equity (Table 3) – we attribute that observation to the influence of large-size firms 
(which are the majority) on the entire sample.  
 
Table 6 
Fixed effects regression output for small-size firms 
DV Return on equity  Return on assets  Tobin’s Q 
 Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3   Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3  Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 
Constant 0.09* 
(1.77) 
0.14*** 
(2.78) 
0.10** 
(2.08) 
 0.08** 
(2.11) 
0.13*** 
(3.83) 
0.10*** 
(2.70) 
 0.23 
(0.35) 
0.61 
(0.83) 
0.48 
(0.86) 
TD to assets  0.002 
(0.03) 
   0.03 
(0.51) 
   1.10 
(1.07) 
  
TD to equity   -0.08*** 
(-3.24) 
   -0.06*** 
(-3.42) 
   -0.13 
(0.30) 
 
LTD to equity    -0.01** 
(-4.04) 
   -0.01*** 
(-4.71) 
   0.03 
(1.00) 
Asset tang. -0.11 
(-1.50) 
-0.11** 
(-2.11) 
-0.11 
(-1.47) 
 -0.09* 
(-1.74) 
-0.89*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.08** 
(-1.99) 
 -0.81 
(-1.37) 
-0.41 
(-0.94) 
-0.41 
(-0.96) 
Firm size -0.29*** 
(-4.43) 
-0.31*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.28*** 
(-4.07) 
 0.45*** 
(7.09) 
0.43 
(1.54) 
0.45*** 
(6.70) 
 -8.33*** 
(-7.58) 
-8.31*** 
(-6.43) 
-8.29*** 
(-6.78) 
Sales Growth 0.34*** 
(5.50) 
0.36*** 
(5.63) 
0.33*** 
(5.10) 
 -0.40*** 
(-7.31) 
-0.39 
(-1.39) 
-0.41*** 
(-7.04) 
 3.43*** 
(10.13) 
8.62*** 
(8.67) 
8.63*** 
(9.15) 
Growth opp. 0.41** 
(2.21) 
0.59*** 
(3.65) 
0.40** 
(2.30) 
 0.47*** 
(3.05) 
0.64*** 
(4.15) 
0.47*** 
(3.19) 
 3.43 
(1.40) 
4.29 
(1.66) 
4.03* 
(1.71) 
Adj. R
2 0.52 0.56 0.54  0.69 0.72 0.71  0.62 0.61 0.61 
D-W test 1.24 1.34 1.28  1.09 1.17 1.12  1.15 1.13 1.13 
F-statistic 6.68 
[0.00] 
7.58 
[0.00] 
7.01 
[0.00] 
 12.55 
[0.00] 
14.36 
[0.00] 
13.40 
[0.00] 
 9.44 
[0.00] 
9.14 
[0.00] 
9.16 
[0.00] 
Restd. F-test 9.70 
[0.00] 
9.45 
[0.00] 
9.10 
[0.00] 
 19.43 
[0.00] 
19.74 
[0.00] 
19.35 
[0.00] 
 14.21 
[0.00] 
12.04 
[0.00] 
13.85 
[0.00] 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates of fixed effects regression for small-size firms, with t-statistics in braces. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Diagnostic statistics are at the bottom of the 
table with p-values, where necessary, in square braces. DV is dependent variable; TD is total debt; LTD is long-term 
debt; “tang” is tangibility; D-W is Durbin-Watson and “Restd” is restricted. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 
evaluated against critical values tabulated in Bhargava et al. (1982); the relevant critical values at 5% are:     
       and    = 1.8769. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Tobin’s Q regressions show that, even for small firms, capital structure does not affect firm value. The 
results also show that economic growth has no effect on the value of small firms. Since economic growth 
positively affects firm profitability, does this result imply that profitability has no impact on firm value? 
On the contrary, we believe that the effect of economic expansion (and by extension, profitability) would 
be reflected on firm value (Tobin’s Q) with a lag. Alternatively, investors do not build, into their 
15 
 
valuation of firms, contemporaneous developments in the economy, because such information is only 
revealed to them with a lag. Without a doubt, this is an issue for future investigation. As expected, sales 
growth positively and significantly affects value of small size firms. Contrarily, size negatively and 
significantly affects firm value for small size firms – again, this is not unexpected because smaller firms 
are likely to attract analyst/investor scepticism because of their perceived inability, everything constant, to 
sustainably generate adequate cash flows in the future. 
 
Table 7 
Fixed effects regression output for large-size firms 
DV Return on equity  Return on assets  Tobin’s Q 
 Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3   Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3  Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 
Constant -0.78*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.88*** 
(-3.50) 
-1.07*** 
(3.69) 
 -0.61** 
(-2.00) 
-0.73*** 
(3.42) 
-0.86*** 
(-3.43) 
 18.26 
(1.19) 
18.07 
(1.18) 
20.31 
(1.17) 
TD to assets  -0.05 
(-0.53) 
   -0.06 
(-0.86) 
   4.12 
(0.93) 
  
TD to equity   -0.02 
(-1.25) 
   -0.02 
(-1.56) 
   -0.45 
(-1.13) 
 
LTD to equity    -0.06** 
(-2.11) 
   -0.05** 
(-2.55) 
   0.03 
(0.13) 
Asset tang. -0.17** 
(-2.18) 
-0.14* 
(-1.96) 
-0.06 
(-0.96) 
 -0.21*** 
(-3.90) 
-0.17** 
(-2.55) 
-0.12** 
(-2.30) 
 2.62 
(0.83) 
2.31 
(0.86) 
1.72 
(0.74) 
Firm size -0.05*** 
(-3.81) 
0.06*** 
(4.90) 
-0.06*** 
(-4.70) 
 0.05*** 
(2.76) 
0.05*** 
(4.89) 
0.05*** 
(4.15) 
 -0.81 
(-0.93) 
-0.64 
(-0.90) 
-0.77 
(-0.94) 
Sales Growth 0.04 
(0.84) 
0.04 
(0.74) 
0.08* 
(1.67) 
 0.04 
(0.90) 
0.04 
(0.69) 
0.07 
(1.41) 
 -2.51 
(-1.28) 
-2.60 
(-1.28) 
-2.52 
(-1.23) 
Growth opp. -0.86* 
(-1.86) 
-0.86* 
(-1.85) 
-0.75* 
(1.98) 
 0.26 
(0.80) 
0.26 
(0.58) 
-0.17 
(-0.38) 
 -33.39 
(-1.02) 
-32.54 
(-1.01) 
-32.72 
(-1.01) 
Adj. R
2
  0.37 
0.38 0.47  0.34 0.35 0.42  0.02 0.02 0.01 
D-W test  1.05 
1.02 1.18  1.34 1.32 1.39  1.07 1.09 1.08 
F-statistic  4.36 
[0.00] 
4.47 
[0.00] 
6.05 
[0.00] 
 3.91 
[0.00] 
4.05 
[0.00] 
5.05 
[0.00] 
 1.13 
[0.31] 
1.10 
[0.35] 
1.08 
[0.37] 
Restd. F-test  2.82 
[0.00] 
3.04 
[0.00] 
3.67 
[0.00] 
 2.40 
[0.00] 
2.67 
[0.00] 
2.95 
[0.00] 
 1.35 
[0.18] 
1.48 
[0.12] 
1.47 
[0.12] 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates of fixed effects regression for large-size firms, with t-statistics in braces. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Diagnostic statistics are at the bottom of the 
table with p-values, where necessary, in square braces. DV is dependent variable; TD is total debt; LTD is long-term 
debt; “tang” is tangibility; D-W is Durbin-Watson and “Restd” is restricted. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 
evaluated against critical values tabulated in Bhargava et al. (1982); the relevant critical values at 5% are:     
       and    = 1.8769. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 7 provides fixed effects regression outputs for large-size firms. The results show that capital 
structure is only important to financial performance when leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term 
debts to equity. This ratio has consistently recorded negative and statistically significant influence on 
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firms’ profitability, suggesting that perhaps the fixed financing charges it imposes is one of the most 
important items adversely affecting firms’ bottom lines, an indication of high cost of long-term debt 
financing in Kenya. This is an important observation that might well explain the preference for equity 
financing among listed firms in the country. There is a predominantly negative relationship between 
leverage metrics and financial performance even for the sample of large-size firms.  
 
Among the control variables, firm size significantly and negatively affects the return on equity 
(shareholders suffer when the firm excessively diversifies) while positively affecting the return on assets 
(diversification is apparently good for stakeholders in general). Asset tangibility, significantly and 
negatively affect the return on equity and return on assets of large firms while sales growth appears not to 
have an important influence on the profitability of large firms in Kenya. As is the case with the overall 
sample, neither leverage nor any of the control variables affects the value (Tobin’s Q) of large-size firms.  
 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The capital structure debate is one that is unlikely to be settled soon. The importance of setting the right 
capital structure policy is such that it affects firms’ financial performance (as our study shows) and 
therefore plays a key role in determining their competitiveness and ability to operate as going concerns. 
Even in Africa, where just a few studies have been conducted, consensus has been hard to build on the 
right, or optimum, level of debt to employ to maximize value for firms’ owners. 
 
Our study contributes to this debate in a number of ways. First, we document evidence suggesting that 
leverage significantly, and negatively, affects the profitability of listed firms in Kenya. Second, using 
Tobin’s Q, we demonstrate that leverage has no effect on firm value. Our results are robust to alternative 
panel specifications and hold for both small size and large-size firms. Third, we control for the effects of 
other variables that affect firm performance. We find very interesting results from the control variables: 
asset tangibility, sales growth and firm size are important determinants of profitability. Surprisingly, asset 
tangibility consistently has a negative relationship with profitability. 
 
For small firms, our results indicate that sales growth and firm size are important factors driving firm 
value. Curiously, these variables do not appear to drive the value of large firms. Finally, we also observe 
that although the usage of debt financing has grown in Kenya over the decade 2002 – 2011, many of the 
firms listed on the country’s bourse have tended to shy away from the corporate bond markets, whose 
issues have been dwarfed by equity issues. It is therefore possible that expensive forms of debt, with more 
adverse effects on revenues, have more often been used to finance Kenyan firms’ business activities.  
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